The wars of decolonization fought by European colonial powers after 1945 had their origins in the fraught history of imperial domination, but were framed and shaped by the emerging politics of the Cold War. Militia recruited from amongst the local population was a common feature in all the counter-insurgencies mounted against armed nationalist risings in this period. Styled here as 'loyalists', these militia fought against nationalists. Loyalist histories have often been obscured by nationalist narratives, but their experience was varied and illuminates the deeper ambiguities of the decolonization story, some loyalists being subjected to vengeful violence at liberation, others actually claiming the victory for themselves and seizing control of the emergent state, while others still maintained a role as fighting units into the Cold War. This introductory essay discusses the categorization of these 'irregular auxiliary' forces that constituted the armed element of loyalism after 1945, and introduces seven case studies from five European colonialisms-Portugal (Angola), the Netherlands (Indonesia), France (Algeria), Belgium (Congo) and Britain (Cyprus, Kenya and southern Arabia).
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The nationalist wars of liberation and decolonization fought in Africa and Asia against imperial rule, from the 1940s to the 1970s, marked the death throes of the old European empires, and heralded the birth pangs of the emerging states of what would collectively become known as the Third World. These wars arose out of the local histories of European colonial domination, and have been studied by historians primarily as individual episodes of nationalist formation and state-making. 1 Only relatively recently have historians begun to acknowledge that the liberation struggles that took form after 1945 were framed, shaped and connected by the emerging global Cold War. 2 Some of these struggles had their origins in the ideological contests that would become deterministic in the Cold War. In Asia, French, Dutch and British colonialists, all fought to re-establish imperial rule in their colonies at the end of the Second World War, the conflicts in Indo-China, Malaya and the Dutch East Indies being immediately influenced by global movements and ideologies just as they were adopting a nationalist configuration. 3 Other wars lacked ideological drivers, but nonetheless were adopted as sites of Cold War struggle with the support of external actors. In Africa, external influence on national liberation came a little later than in Asia, and in several different forms, but in Algeria, 4 Congo, 5 Guinea-Bissau, 6 Angola, 7 and even Ethiopia 8 (whose anti-imperial revolution was not against colonialism), the politics and affiliations of the Cold War ultimately played a profound role in defining the character of liberation struggle. 9 Challenging though it surely is, historical understanding of these Cold War interactions with decolonization is essential if we are to move beyond viewing the end of empires solely from a metropolitan perspective of political manoeuvring and economic reorientation, and instead examine the process through the colonial experience of conflict and its consequences in the making of nationalisms. 10 Decolonization did not originate in the politics of the Cold War, but its outcomes cannot be understood unless seen in a Cold War context. This collection of essays elaborates the connection between decolonization and the Cold War through an examination of the wars of liberation fought in British, French, Dutch, Belgian and Portuguese colonies in Africa and Asia. The focus is upon counter-insurgencies, and specifically the engagement of local forces as combatants to fight alongside imperial armies and against nationalist insurgents. For very obvious reasons, the histories of such groups have remained obscure, often tainted or disparaged by a nationalist narrative that styles them as mercenaries or collaborators, and always as enemies. 11 Recovering such histories requires a local perspective, but understanding the significance of these struggles demands an awareness of global processes and connections. As Thomas and Thompson remind us, 'Violent colonial collapse … was political contagion: the one irresistible pandemic in the post-Second World War international system'. 12 Their plea for a comparative and better-integrated history of decolonization, then, is addressed in the essays gathered here, each describing colonial exit, and in particular the distinctive forms of violence, in the context of the Cold War. 13 The collection includes a discussion of the categorization of 'irregular auxiliary' forces after 1945, 14 along with seven case studies of insurgencies against five different European colonialisms-Portugal (Angola), the Netherlands (Indonesia), France (Algeria), Belgium (Congo) and Britain (Cyprus, Kenya, and southern Arabia). While it is not essential to find a term that can unite these local allies of empire in a common category, the lack of such a term has hampered any attempt at comparison. As Kalyvas has noted, there is a tendency to think that all wars of this kind are complex, intimate and intricate, and that they are driven only by the logic of local contestations. 15 But we contend here that these groups do have strikingly common features, that they behave in similar ways, and are deployed in remarkably similar circumstances. Terms that identify them as collaborators are undoubtedly too pejorative to be useful, inflaming political debate rather than inspiring sober reflection. Borrowing from British imperial history, we therefore propose a term that is at once more neutral, but also has sufficient ambiguity to accommodate a degree of variance: that term is loyalist.
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The local allies of empire took many names for themselves, invariably reflecting their origins in the local identity politics under colonial rule, but their colonial masters were most inclined to see them as 'loyal' forces. Though their terms of engagement and their motivations varied enormously, all were groups that were willing to remain loyal to the colonial regime in the face of the nationalist challenge. Such loyalty was often instrumental in achieving the protection or security of an identified community, it was frequently based in firm vested interest and it sometimes adopted a highly strategic approach to conflict and violence, but none of this implied support for imperialism either in principle or in practice. As Anderson To introduce the key themes that determined the basis of these colonial alliances in the end game of empire, we will first survey the allies and their aspirations and expectations. European colonial powers held the dominant position in these asymmetric wars, and they often used local auxiliaries to turn insurgency into civil war-immensely destructive for all the indigenous forces draw in on both sides, but effectively limiting the level of military commitment required from the metropole. Loyal allies might still emerge victorious in such conditions, but the political cost would be heavy when colonial exit came. The second part of this introduction will then examine the impact of exit, highlighting the consequences this had for the allies left behind. The distinctive character of the European counter-insurgency campaigns fought after 1945 was the key feature of exit, and in these 'small wars', loyalist forces played prominent roles. Their ability to use their military position to negotiate a more advantageous political future for themselves in the exit settlement came to be critical in determining the fate of loyalist communities, a feature that has been overlooked both by historians of decolonization and by political scientists and military historians who analyse the counter-insurgency campaigns that so often formed the critical prelude to exit.
Allies and empires
In December 1951, Britain's campaign against the communist insurgents of Malaya National Liberation Army (MNLA) was in crisis. The High Commissioner, Sir Henry Gurney, had been assassinated two months earlier. His successor, Field Marshal Sir Gerald Templer, was not yet in post. The insurgency, dominated by Malaya's Chinese community, held the upper hand. In advance of Templer's arrival, British officials and officers spent much time debating what more could be done to check the progress of the insurgents. Malaya's British rulers came to realize that loyalists recruited from among the Chinese population could be the most effective wielders of the destructive power of counter-insurgency. As the chairman of Perak's War Executive Committee put it in December 1951, 'the emergency must develop or must be made to develop into a "civil war" amongst the Chinese before quick and substantial progress can be achieved with Chinese assistance.' 21 The 190,000 members of the Home Guard, the armed militia that, like the insurgency, was dominated by Chinese rank-and-file, were accordingly thrust into the battle. 22 British military commanders and civilian administrators reached similar conclusions elsewhere in empire in its final tumultuous decades. Across the full spectrum of Britain's wars of decolonization, local 'loyalist' forces were recruited amongst indigenous communities and empowered to enact counter-insurgency. Ethnicity and identity were as important in this politics of divide-and-rule as was ideology. In Kenya, the loyalists were drawn from the same ethnic community, the Kikuyu, as the Mau Mau insurgents. 23 In Cyprus, ethnic divisions between Turkish and Greek communities were exploited and Turks recruited into the auxiliary police to confront the EOKA campaign for enosis. 24 In Malaya, the Chinese members of the Home Guard fought alongside Malay and Indian. 25 The result was, in Charles Townshend's words, Britain's civil wars: a series of conflicts that did not just mark the end of the British imperial age but which also scarred the communities embroiled in them for decades to come. 26 As the essays gathered together in this special issue of the International History Review make clear, this story of local alliance in British colonial counter-insurgency was in fact part of a wider global history of the changing nature of warfare in the mid-twentieth century. 27 Dutch, French and Portuguese colonists would each adopt policies similar to those of their British counterparts. These declining imperial powers were either unable or unwilling to commit sizeable numbers of regular troops in colonial wars, 28 or found their conventional military tactics and strategies to be inadequate in the face of the people's war mounted by nationalist insurgencies across the colonial world. 29 The European colonial powers, denuded of the military superiority that had allowed them to hold sway in earlier decades, now waged war by proxy: relying on the support of locally recruited militias and auxiliaries drawn from colonized populations to fight on behalf of the colonial regimes. Counter-insurgency was thereby privatized by local actors, in a process similar to Stathis Kalyvas' description of the logic of irregular civil wars. 30 Reliant upon such actors, imperial military ambitions were sometimes bent and twisted to suit the localized agendas of their indigenous partners. Local allies always had some degree of agency, even if its opportunities had to be seized when the moment was right. 31 Though the word has uncomfortable connotations that might be questioned in some of the cases to be examined in this collection, this was collaboration writ large. The affiliation and deployment of military auxiliaries recruited with the support of local political allies, whether mercenaries or not, had long been part of the military and political history of imperial expansion. 32 Collaboration was nothing new. Indeed, for more than a generation past Ronald Robinson's modestly titled 'sketch for a theory of collaboration' has profoundly influenced scholarship on the relationship between imperial subjects and their rulers, especially in regard to conquest, coercion and control. As Robinson explained, collaborative actors from among colonies and soon-to-be colonized societies were as vital to the process of empire-building as the British administrators, politicians, bankers, soldiers and missionaries that had once dominated the studies of British imperial history. Robinson termed this local support for imperial rule the 'non-European foundations of European imperialism'. 33 European imperial expansion was never stifled by a shortage of aspiring collaborators. Collaboration with 'native polities' became the norm and not the exception from the later eighteenth century right through the nineteenth century, stoking the engine of imperial expansion. 34 It was at first most visible on the battlefields of conquest. Too often, notably
in South Asia and in many parts of Africa, local leaders initially collaborated because they thought they could turn European military might to their own purposes. Across Africa, local allies helped extend European power during the military conquest of much of the continent 35 -is eastern Africa, for example, Maasai auxiliaries crushed British enemies in 'punitive expeditions', 36 while the standing army of the kingdom of Buganda was deployed under British command as the 'sub-imperialists' of colonial conquest throughout the inter-lacustrine lands after 1900. 37 Towards the end of the nineteenth century, in the age of 'imperial recklessness', as Porch terms it, 38 European imperial powers escalated their colonial 'small wars' and used increasingly brutal tactics, often enlarging the scale of operations by securing and deploying local allies. The French forces in West Africa depended upon local allies as they extended control through the Sahel in a last quarter of the nineteenth century, while the British made use of a variety of African allies in their campaigns against the Asante kingdom. 39 Further afield, other allies played critical roles in the other great imperial wars of the age. In South Asia, by the end of the eighteenth century, the British military establishment entirely depended upon locally recruited forces and the support of 'friendlies', while their enemies, as in the case of the Maratha Wars of 1803, themselves exploited imperial rivalries to employ European mercenaries. 40 In China, the British formed the first Chinese Regiment as part of the efforts to suppress the Boxer Rebellion. 41 Collaboration then became critical to the functioning of the new colonial states established after conquest was complete-precisely the everyday, bureaucratic aspect of colonial governance that Robinson's 'theory' sought to highlight. British imperialists codified their relationships with collaborating elites through indirect rule and customary law, constructing emergent castes and classes whose 'loyalty' was garnered through participation but not incorporation, while their French counterparts created opportunities for the preferment of those who affiliated with the colonial project that at least held the possibility of full equality. 42 Loyalism became sharpest at times of rebellion and insurrection, when it must inevitably be put to the test, but it need not originate in conflict. Notions of loyalty were most often constructed through the ordinary functions of colonial governance, as African and Asian subalterns made their own 'bargain of collaboration'. 43 Inducement brought loyalists into the imperial fold, but the rewards for loyalty generally declined as its practice became more common. The limits of reward came also to be determined by race, especially, though not exclusively, within the British Empire. With the rise of racial ideology in the wake of the Indian Rebellion, the Morant Bay uprising of 1865 and the American Civil War, ideas of race became more influential in the conduct of the day-to-day business of British imperialism, 44 and this adjusted the terms upon which collaboration might be negotiated. Among British imperialists, as Catherine Hall has trenchantly observed, 'their enthusiasm for racialised others was strictly limited'. 45 This trend to prejudice was less pervasive in the French empire, where the separation of colonial subjects from metropolitan citizens was less absolute, 46 whilst in the Portuguese empire questions of race were mediated, and thus rendered more complex, by the large mestico populations in Angola and elsewhere. 47 However, by the end of the nineteenth century, it was generally true across all of the European empires that the status and position of nonwhite intermediaries had diminished. 48 Such ideas bled into military strategy. By the beginning of the twentieth century, the prevailing wisdom was that regular forces were best placed to counter irregular opponents. 49 According to the most-respected expert of the day, Charles Callwell, local populations were not to be trusted but could be used as scouts or to provide basic intelligence on the movements of the enemy. 50 His 'semi-official manual' for the conduct of small wars gave little further consideration to the more extensive use of irregular troops made up of members of local populations and none to the encouragement of broader political opposition to the anti-colonial cause. 51 Callwell's ideas were echoed in practice during the South African War. At its outbreak in 1899, High Commissioner Alfred Milner was convinced of the futility of irregular paramilitary units attempting to repulse attacks from the Transvaal and Orange Free State: 'In no cases should a number of small and weak town guards be formed.' Milner understood that this meant loyalists were to be left to their fate in case of Boer offensives, but he thought, 'To arm loyalists where they are hopelessly outnumbered is to incite attack'. 52 In particular, Milner and other British and white South African political leaders were much exercised by any suggestion of arming black and Coloured communities in the Cape and Natal colonies. 53 Despite such fears, as scouts, porters, guides, spies, members of militias and troops, more than 100,000 black and Coloured loyalists collectively played a decisive role in the war; perhaps nearly a third of these men were armed by 1902. Moreover, by providing their support to the British non-combatant black and Coloured loyalists 'effectively closed hundreds of square miles of the annexed states to commando penetration' and denied their labour to Afrikaner employers sympathetic to the Boer cause. 54 Champions of black and Coloured involvement in the war effort hoped to receive reward in the form of at least a halt to the erosion of the rights and claims to citizenship of Southern Africa's non-white communities. But their bargain was lost. Instead, segregationist social and economic policies were introduced in the Transvaal, where the franchise remained off limits to black and Coloured communities. In the Cape and Natal, the political rights of black and Coloured voters were subject to more stringent qualifications and restrictions imposed on their ability to buy land. 55 For the indigenous allies of empire, the military costs of loyalty were not always matched by the political rewards to be gained. The perpetration of violence on behalf of the Empire or a colonial state always threated to be a way of colonial subjects claiming the rights of imperial citizenship. As long as its members jealously guarded an ethnically and racially exclusive notion of citizenship within empire, the prospective path to citizenship that seemed to be opened by loyalty meant loyalists drawn from the ranks of imperial subjects were to be scorned. Considerable efforts were made in South Africa and other settings to limit the ability of non-white subjects to perpetrate violence on behalf of the colonial and imperial state and to obscure the fact that this was, in reality, happening. South Africa was an extreme example, but the efficacy of loyalty as a political strategy practiced by colonized peoples to blunt dull the edges of imperial rule seemed to have run its course by the late 1920s.
Exits from empire
The struggles triggered by the efforts to establish a new world order after 1945 resurrected loyalty and collaboration as effective strategies within the imperial world. War and insurrection tested loyalty as nothing else could. As France, Britain and the Netherlands tried to re-establish their control of parts of their empires lost to enemy occupation in the Second World War, they looked to local allies to consolidate their political hold. 56 But nationalisms now complicated the politics of affiliation all over Africa and Asia. Anti-imperial rhetoric was not only a product of new Cold War solidarities after 1945. Though it emerged very powerfully within many local nationalist movements over the course of the 1940s, it had taken root in the radical leadership of the many 'small struggles' against forms of colonial domination during the inter-war years. 57 Radicals scattered throughout the colonial world now found new connections, and a kind of common purpose in the international politics of the post-war world. The comfortable ease of functional, daily collaborations practised by colonial subalterns in the service of empires 58 became politically toxic. Loyalty to empire was now denigrated as betrayal, its adherents castigated as 'selfseeking scoundrels' and the 'running dogs of imperialism'. 59 The nature of colonial warfare was also transformed by the end of the 1940s, and this altered the terms upon which the bargain with loyalists would be made. Although guerrilla wars had been part of modern military history throughout much of the world, in the period after the Second World War 'an unprecedented number of resistance struggles in Europe and Asia brought belief in the concept of people's war to a new level… .' Across the imperial world, anti-colonial movements became guerrilla armies to great effect. South-East Asia, subject to both the experience of resistance to the Japanese occupation and particularly the intense influence of Mao's approach to guerrilla war, 'was the epicentre of this earthquake'. 60 Insurgencies swept across the colonial world, often supported by external actors and increasingly able to adopt the moral high ground against oppressive imperialisms. French, British, Dutch and Portuguese colonialists fought hard to resist each individual rising, but were ultimately overwhelmed by the global character of the movements they confronted. 61 The French, especially, were out-flanked and undermined by the international credentials of the insurgents they faced in Indo-China and in Algeria. 62 As Thomas and Thompson conclude, 'the "weak" won the battles of decolonisation because they were better than the strong in maintaining transnational networks of support'. 63 And as colonialism crumbled, the new world order embraced national liberation movements as legitimate, Geneva Protocol 1 of 1977 enhancing 'the powers of the insurgent in relation to the state by justifying resort to war in the struggle against colonial domination, racism, and foreign occupation'. 64 This all reinforced the justice of anti-colonial struggle, and legitimized its violence, allowing nationalists to present their escape from the shackles of colonialism as part of their nation-building once independence was won. 65 In this narrative, there was no place for those who had fought against liberation.
Important though counter-insurgency warfare proved to be, the dynamic of loyalist politics cannot be fully explained only with reference to armed struggle. Wider political aspirations drove anti-colonial rebellion, and after 1945, these rapidly came to be influenced by global trends. This broader context of decolonization transformed imperial notions of citizenship, as well as altering how the colonial powers assessed their future geo-politics. The politics of maintaining colonial order would transform into the politics of Cold War affiliation. In the post-war era, what Wm. Roger Louis and Ronald Robinson describe as 'the imperialism of decolonization' thus demanded that relationships with loyalists be reconstituted at the denouement of empire. 66 The loyalty of colonized peoples was no longer scorned and left unrecognized: it was now an affiliation that had practical significance in the present struggle, and future importance for building strategic and political influence. In the end game of empire, loyalism therefore came to be embraced and encouraged with promises of rewards-as several of the essays in this collection illustrate. Chinese loyalty allowed Chinese elites in Malaya to win guarantees of citizenship for all Malaya-born residents of the new nation in 1957. 67 Loyal Kikuyu in Kenya took up a privileged position within the fraught, protracted negotiations leading up to Kenyan independence in 1963. 68 Turkish-Cypriot loyalty provided a mechanism by which the Turkish state became embroiled in the debates surrounding Cypriot citizenship and postcolonial sovereignty. 69 The harkis of Algeria 70 and the Angolan servicemen in the Portuguese armed forces 71 similarly stretched and challenged metropolitan notions of national identity and citizenship in a decolonizing world. The imperial allies discussed in this special issue were active participants in efforts to remake relationships between former (and soon-to-be-former) colonies and the post-colonial world. Some of the 'new allies' in the post-colonial world were in fact reinvented relics of the imperial age, such as the mercenaries and their supporters who defeated the insurgent nationalists in the Congo after 1963, an alliance of anti-communists and anti-nationalists born again in the cauldron of Africa's emergent Cold War politics. 72 From such a perspective, the victimization of loyalists was often understood by its perpetrators as functional to state-building and its required solidarities, thus legitimizing violence as vengeance and cleansing-enacted as very public reprisal in Algeria, 77 and more covertly but equally brutally in Kenya. 78 But where nationalism was more opaque, or internally divided by factionalism, loyalists could remake themselves as nationalists and escape retribution, as Oliveira explains for Angola. 79 Where oppression was enforced with sufficient rigour to suppress nationalist politics as well as defeat the insurgency, as in Kenya, it was even possible for loyalists to win the peace and seize control of the post-colonial state. 80 Whether abandoned and victimized, as in Aden and Algeria, or victorious, as in Kenya, these allies of late imperial power helped shape the post-colonial world. Their histories need to be reintegrated into the local histories of decolonization, and their significance for the emerging Cold War properly considered. New nations were formed from territories with economies and political structures dominated by connections to the outside world as a consequence of imperial rule and the forms of informal influence that predated European colonialism. 81 The fate of loyalists within them reveals much about the extent to which nationalism in any one territory aspired to remaking those external connections in the aftermath of imperial exit. Finally, we should note that the case made here for studying allies in the conflicts at the end of empire has a resonance that carries forward into other examples of exit from less conventional imperialist settings in the Cold War era. There can be no more compelling example of the political dynamics of loyalism at the point of exit than the American evacuation of Saigon in 1975, at the end of the Vietnam War. US officials estimated that there were over 2 million South Vietnamese anti-communist 'loyalists' who might seek refuge in America if such opportunity was presented. This was a further price the US was not prepared to pay for a war that had already drained the national coffers, creating a mountain of public debt and poisoning the patriotism of an entire generation. Operation Frequent Wind saw the evacuation of thousands of American personnel, along with some of their most trusted South Vietnamese allies, but the vast bulk of the local loyalist cadres were left to their fate. 82 Graphic images of the Saigon evacuation, captured in newsreel footage broadcast by America television channels, exposed the dilemmas of US policy decision-making to public gaze. 83 Vietnam revealed and exposed the hazards of affiliation without secure reward when exit came. Dilemmas of a different kind confronted the black loyalist military units deployed in southern Angola, and in Namibia, during the protracted Border War fought by South Africa from the mid-1960s until 1989. 84 This war comprised of multiple counter-insurgency campaigns that closely resembled the small wars of decolonization in the 1950s and 1960s, and the use of black loyalist units remains one of its most controversial aspects.
The most infamous of all these units, the 32nd (Buffalo) Battalion was not accepted into the reformed South African Defence Forces by the incoming African National Congress (ANC) government in 1994, and was disbanded. 85 Here, again, the loyalist bargain could not be fulfilled at exit. Might more recent armed insurrections, including the international 'interventions' linked to both the global war on terror and the Arab Spring, 86 also offer useful comparisons with the loyalist militia affiliations of the small wars of decolonization? Having previously largely neglected the part played by state-sponsored militias in conflict, in favour of an overwhelming concentration on the dynamics of insurgent groups, political scientists have recently 'discovered' the significance of what we would term 'loyalist forces' in all kinds of modern counter-insurgencies. Amongst the rich array of work recently published, 87 Jentzsch et al. have called for detailed engagement with the multiple cases where local militias have been recruited to assist the incumbent forces of the state in their battles against insurgents. 88 Though the focus of political science research on this question has concentrated on conflicts since the 1980s, 89 and especially since the end of the Cold War, there is clearly considerable value to be gained from including Cold War and late colonial wars of decolonization examples in such comparative studies. From all of these cases, historical and more contemporary, there is a great deal yet to be learned about why local communities form militias to fight against anti-government insurgents and how loyalist bargains are struck. By making such broad comparisons, we might then understand whether the colonial cases reported in this collection were truly distinctive, or part of a broader and more enduring pattern of counter-insurgency response.
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